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Abstract
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5 clade 2.3.4.4 viruses were first introduced into Europe in late 2014 and re-
introduced in late 2016, following detections in Asia and Russia. In contrast to the 2014–15 H5N8 wave, there was substantial
local virus amplification in wild birds in Europe in 2016–17 and associated wild bird mortality, with evidence for occasional
gene exchange with low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Since December 2017, several European countries have
again reported events or outbreaks with HPAI H5N6 reassortant viruses in both wild birds and poultry, respectively.
Previous phylogenetic studies have shown that the two earliest incursions of HPAI H5N8 viruses originated in Southeast
Asia and subsequently spread to Europe. In contrast, this study indicates that recent HPAI H5N6 viruses evolved from the
H5N8 2016–17 viruses during 2017 by reassortment of a European HPAI H5N8 virus and wild host reservoir LPAI viruses. The
genetic and phenotypic differences between these outbreaks and the continuing detections of HPAI viruses in Europe are a
cause of concern for both animal and human health. The current co-circulation of potentially zoonotic HPAI and LPAI virus
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strains in Asia warrants the determination of drivers responsible for the global spread of Asian lineage viruses and the
potential threat they pose to public health.
Key words: virology, H5N6, phylogeny, avian influenza, emerging diseases, highly pathogenic avian influenza.
1. Introduction
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses cause out-
breaks of disease, often resulting in mortality in poultry and wild
bird species. Since 2003, HPAI H5 viruses of the A/Goose/
Guangdong/1/1996 (GsGd) lineage have been circulating enzooti-
cally in poultry in several countries in South and Southeast Asia,
and Africa. Periodically, these HPAI H5 viruses have been intro-
duced into wild birds with subsequent spread to other geo-
graphic areas, likely through bird migration (Verhagen, Herfst
and Fouchier 2015; Lycett et al. 2016). Since late 2013, HPAI vi-
ruses with an H5 heamagglutinin (HA) from clade 2.3.4.4 viruses
with different neuraminidase (NA) subtypes (e.g. H5N8, H5N6,
H5N1) have been circulating in Southeast Asia. Clade 2.3.4.4
(H5N8) viruses of two distinct groups, commonly referred to as
Group A (Buan-like) and Group B (Gochang-like), were first
detected in China and South Korea in late 2013/early 2014 (Ku
et al. 2014; Wu et al. 2014; Zhou et al. 2016). Viruses belonging to
Group A emerged in late 2014 and spread to North America and
Europe almost simultaneously. After their initial detection, clade
2.3.4.4 Group B (H5N8) viruses were not detected in Southeast
Asia until May 2016, when they were detected at Lake Uvs-Nur,
Russia (Lee et al. 2017a) and Qinghai lake, China (Li et al. 2017).
From May 2016, the clade 2.3.4.4 Group B H5N8 viruses subse-
quently spread to most European countries causing numerous
outbreaks in poultry (OIE 2016) and massive die-offs in wild birds
(Beerens et al. 2017; Kleyheeg et al. 2017; Pohlmann et al. 2017),
and infected both poultry and wild birds in multiple African
countries (OIE 2016, 2017; Twabela et al. 2018). Several reassort-
ment events also occurred, leading to the emergence and detec-
tion of HPAI H5N5 in several European countries, Georgia and
Israel between November 2016 and June 2017 (Alarcon et al. 2018)
and HPAI H5N6 in Greece in February 2017 (OIE 2017). HPAI H5N6
first emerged in poultry in early 2014 having previously been
detected in an environmental sample in late 2013 and in a live
duck, sampled in early 2014 in China. Genetic analysis showed
this HPAI H5N6 virus to be a reassortant consisting of a clade
2.3.4.4 HA, an NA related to Chinese low pathogenic avian influ-
enza (LPAI) H6N6 duck viruses, and an internal gene cassette
closely related to 2011 HPAI H5 clade 2.3.2.1 viruses (FAO 2014; Bi
et al. 2016a,b). The first viruses were later assigned to Groups C
and D. Currently, clade 2.3.4.4 Group C (H5N6 viruses from China
in 2013 (Qi et al. 2014), Laos and Vietnam in 2014 and Hong Kong
in 2015, and H5N1 viruses from China and Vietnam in 2014) and
Group D (H5N6 viruses from China and Vietnam 2013–14, includ-
ing human strains) viruses have also been classified as sub-
groups (Lee et al. 2016, 2017b) although this nomenclature has
not been formally adopted. HPAI H5N6 viruses belonging to clade
2.3.4.4 Group B were first detected in late 2017 in Japan, South
Korea (Kim et al. 2018; Lee et al. 2018a), and the Netherlands
(Beerens et al. 2018). From mid-December 2017, HPAI H5N6
Group B viruses were also detected in wild birds in Switzerland,
UK, Germany, Sweden, Ireland, Denmark, Iran, Slovakia, and
Finland (Fig. 1). In the Netherlands and Germany, the virus was
also detected in poultry. In the same period, HPAI H5N6 viruses
of clade 2.3.4.4 Group B, along with clade 2.3.4.4 Groups C and D
have been detected in East Asian countries (Lee et al. 2018a).
HPAI H5 viruses pose a significant threat to not only animal
health, particularly to poultry, but also to human health owing
to their zoonotic potential (Adlhoch et al. 2016, 2018). In April
2014, the first fatal human case of HPAI H5N6 virus infection
was identified in China (Pan et al. 2016), with these viruses phy-
logenetically clustering in unofficially-defined clade 2.3.4.4
Group C and 2.3.4.4 Group D (Lee et al. 2016), and one case in
Group B (WHO 2018a). To date (5 October 2018), a total of 21
H5N6 human cases have been reported in China with a high
case fatality rate in diagnosed individuals (F.I.C. 2018; WHO
2018b). Ferret studies showed that although Asian ‘zoonotic’
HPAI H5N6 viruses replicated to high titres in the respiratory
tract, there was no evidence for airborne transmissibility of
these viruses (Herfst et al. 2018).
In this study, we attempt to determine the source of all eight
influenza virus gene segments, and the estimates for the time
to the most recent common ancestors (TMRCA) for the H5 HA
and N6 NA gene segments to investigate when and where these
viruses have evolved. We report the genetic relationships be-
tween the latest HPAI H5N6 viruses isolated from both
European and Asian wild birds and poultry by using whole ge-
nome sequencing and characterize the emerging strains rela-
tive to other circulating viruses in the region.
2. Materials and methods
2.1 Wild bird surveillance and sequencing
Active surveillance programmes in wild birds, i.e. sampling of
living healthy birds, are limited and often project-based, and
resulting data are often not publicly available. Here, continuous
active surveillance activities of influenza virus circulation in
wild birds are reported for the Netherlands and the Republic of
Georgia. Wild birds of various species were caught and sampled
for virus detection as described previously (Munster and
Fouchier 2009; Lewis et al. 2015; Venkatesh et al. 2018). Briefly,
samples were tested for the presence of avian influenza A H5 vi-
ruses using a matrix gene specific and H5 HA gene specific real-
time RT-PCR analysis followed by either Sanger sequencing, as
described before (Munster and Fouchier 2009) (primer sequen-
ces are available upon request), or by MinION sequencing
(Oxford Nanopore technologies). For MinION sequencing, RNA
was extracted using the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (52904,
Qiagen, UK) and a multi segment RT-PCR amplification was per-
formed using the Superscript III high-fidelity RT-PCR Kit (12574-
035, Invitrogen, USA) according to manufacturer’s instructions
using the Opti1 primer set with influenza-specific universal pri-
mers complementary to the conserved 12–3 nucleotides at the
end of all eight genomic segments: Opti1-F1 50-GTTACGCG
CCAGCAAAAGCAGG, Opti1-F2 50 GTTACGCGCCAGCGAAAG
CAGG, and Opti1-R1 50 GTTACGCGCCAGTAGAAACAAGG.
MinION sequencing was performed according to manufacturer’s
instructions using the ID Native barcoding genomic DNA Kit
(EXP-NBD103 and SQK-LSK108, Oxford Nanopore, UK). Raw se-
quence data were demultiplexed using Porechop (https://
github.com/rrwick/Porechop), and a reference-based alignment
was performed using CLC Genomics software, workbench
2 | Virus Evolution, 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ve/article-abstract/5/1/vez004/5476200 by Erasm
us U
niversiteit R
otterdam
 user on 19 D
ecem
ber 2019
8 (CLC Bio), and the full genome Sanger sequence of A/Black-
headed_Gull/Netherlands/29/2017 served as a reference
(EPI_ISL_289714). Primers and adaptors were trimmed from the
raw sequence data and the Phred score for alignment was set to
eight and minimum require coverage was set to 100 reads per
position. Discrepancies in the sequences (insertions or dele-
tions) compared to close reference strains occurred only in ho-
mopolymeric regions, and were manually checked and resolved
by incorporating an ‘N’ at these positions.
2.2 Strains of interest
To better understand the newly emerging HPAI H5N6 viruses
from the 2.3.4.4 Group B lineage, viruses of the H5N6 subtype iso-
lated in or after October 2017 were assigned as strains of interest
(SOI). Depending on the continent of isolation, they were further
classified as Asia-SOI or Europe-SOI (Table 1). Whole genome
sequences for these viruses were obtained from public databases
(GISAID and Genbank). European countries and non-European col-
laborators were asked to contribute any additional HPAI H5N6 and
recent HxN6 sequence data via FLU-LAB-NET (European Union) or
personal communication. HxN6 viruses were not considered SOI
but included in the general set to test if any SOI N6s were closely
related to them. In addition, the Animal and Plant Quarantine
Agency from South Korea shared three whole genomes from HPAI
H5N6 detections since November 2017 (GISAID accession numbers
EPI_ISL_288436, EPI_ISL_288437, EPI_ISL_292349). Sequences of NA
genes from recent (2016–17) LPAI HxN6 viruses from wild birds
from the Netherlands, Belgium, Hungary, and Croatia were also
obtained for the general set. Further, sequences of H5N6 viruses
that were isolated from humans (HUM) in China in 2015, 2016,
and 2017 (Table 1) were collected from GISAID (Supplementary
Table S1) to test whether the genes of any of the emerging SOI
were related to those zoonotic strains.
2.3 Reassortment analyses—visualization of
phylogenetic incongruence
To study the evolution and gene reassortment events of HPAI
H5N6 viruses, a phylogenetic incongruence analysis was
performed by aligning maximum likelihood (ML) trees for all in-
fluenza virus gene segments, except NA. Publicly available
sequences of all eight segments of avian influenza viruses iso-
lated between 1 January 2007 and 30 September 2017 were
downloaded from Genbank. This formed a set of 61,842 sequen-
ces including all segments from all strains namely—HA: 8278,
MP: 6464, NA: 7779, NP: 7382, NS: 6933, PA: 8346, PB1: 8410, PB2:
8250. This set of sequences was supplemented with the addi-
tional H5N6 and HxN6 sequences contributed by collaborators.
Sequences were first subjected to a quality control step
where all duplicate sequences and sequences bearing duplicate
IDs were removed. They were then separated into individual se-
quence datasets for each segment (PB2, PB1, PA, HA, NP, NA,
MP, and NS). Python scripts obtained from https://github.com/
ballesterus/Utensils.git were used to concatenate all segments
from each strain. Only those viral strains which had sequences
from all eight gene segments (4,000 strains) were selected. This
concatenated sequence data was down-sampled using Cluster
Database at High Identity with Tolerance (Li and Godzik 2006;
Fu et al. 2012) to remove sequences with >95, 90, and 80 per
cent sequence identity across the whole genome (all eight seg-
ments). An 80 per cent threshold was chosen as it provided the
best compromise between retaining maximum possible diver-
sity of sequences while retaining the ability to visualize. The
resulting list of 141 strain names was used to extract sequences
from those strains from each individual gene segment sepa-
rately—resulting in the reduced whole-genome (WG) dataset for
each segment.
Sequences of all segments from the SOI were also subjected
to the same down-sampling procedure separately before being
added to their respective WG-segment dataset. However, they
were down-sampled to 99.5 per cent sequence identity (thirty-
nine strains) to retain as much of the current diversity as possi-
ble. Sequences of all segments from all three strains that were
isolated from humans (HUM) were also added, giving a total of
183 strains.
Final datasets were aligned using MAFFT v7.305b (Katoh and
Standley 2013), and trimmed to only retain nucleotides from the
startcodon ATG until the final STOP codon. We inferred ML phy-
logenetic trees for each gene segment using IQ-TREE, 1.5.5
Figure 1. Overview of the number of wild birds reported to be infected with HPAI H5N6 based on the OIE update on avian influenza in animals (types H5 and H7) list
2017/2018 (OIE 2017; OIE 2018) per week starting from the first detection on 7 December 2017. The colours represent the country of detection. The asterisks (*) indicate
the detections of HPAI H5N6 viruses in commercial (green) and backyard (blue) poultry.
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(Nguyen et al. 2015) and ModelFinder (Kalyaanamoorthy et al.
2017) and obtained branch supports with Shimodaira-
Hasegawa-like approximate Likelihood Ratio Test (1,000 repli-
cates) and standard non-parametric bootstrap (100 replicates).
Backronymed adaptable lightweight tree import code
(BALTIC) was used to compare the phylogenetic structure of the
internal genes of the SOI. The phylogenetic position of each
strain was traced, coloured according to the HA (Asia-SOI,
Europe-SOI, H5N8 2016-17 clade, H5N6 Chinese, human H5N6
(HUM), other H5Nx, and LPAI) across unrooted ML trees for HA
and all internal gene segments. Figures were generated by mod-
ifying scripts from a similar analysis (Bell and Bedford 2017) and
editing in Adobe Illustrator. We selected a qualitative palette of
colours using http://colorbrewer2.org/. The modified version of
Table 1. Overview of our SOI of highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses H5N6 divided in Asia-SOI, Europe-SOI, and human H5N6 viruses.
Set Strain name Isolation date
A/mute_swan/Shimane/3211A001/2017 05 November 2017
Asia-SOI A/chicken/Vietnam/QuangBinh/BoTrach1113/2017 13 November 2017
A/mallard/Korea/Jeju-H24/2017 17 November 2017
A/duck/Korea/HD1/2017 17 November 2017
A/spoonbill/Taiwan/DB645/2017 01 December 2017
A/duck/Korea/H35/2017 10 December 2017
A/mallard/Korea/H17-1825/2017 22 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1815/2017 22 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1817/2017 22 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1826/2017 22 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1828/2017 22 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1862/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1866/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1869/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1873/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1879/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1881/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1885/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1887/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1889/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1891/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1893/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1894/2017 23 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K17-1896/2017 23 December 2017
A/Armenian_gull/Republic_of_Georgia/4/2017* 27 December 2017
A/mandarin_duck/Korea/K18-3/2018 18 January 2018
A/mallard/Republic of Georgia/1/2018* 28 January 2018
A/duck/Vietnam/QuangBinh/QN530206/2018 06 February 2018
A/jungle_crow/Hyogo/2803E011/2018 03 March 2018
A/jungle_crow/Hyogo/2803E022/2018 06 March 2018
Europe-SOI A/duck/Netherlands/17017236-001005/2017 07 December 2017
A/duck/Netherlands/17017237-001-005/2017 07 December 2017
A/tufted_duck/Netherlands/17017367-007/2017 09 December 2017
A/mute_swan/Netherlands/17017367-012/2017 09 December 2017
A/mute_swan/Netherlands/17017377-001/2017 09 December 2017
A/great_black-backed_gull/Netherlands/1/2017* 18 December 2017
A/black-headed_gull/Netherlands/29/2017* 18 December 2017
A/common_pochard/Germany-BY/AR09-L02421/2017 28 December 2017
A/mute_swan/England/SA21_180652/2018 02 January 2018
A/Canada_goose/England/AV58_18OPpoolEP1/2018 05 January 2018
A/pochard_duck/England/AVP_18_003254/2018 10 January 2018
A/great_black-backed_gull/Netherlands/1/2018* 23 January 2018
A/Eurasian wigeon/Netherlands/1/2018* 07 February 2018
A/white-tailed_eagle/Denmark/3073-1w/2018 13 February 2018
A/chicken/Netherlands/EMC-1/2018 26 February 2018
A/domestic_duck/Netherlands/EMC-6/2018 13 March 2018
Human A/Guangdong/ZQ874/2015 31 December 2015
A/Shenzhen/1/2016 07 January 2016
A/Anhui/33162/2016 28 April 2016
A/Anhui/33163/2016 29 April 2016
A/Hunan/55555/2016 18 November 2016
A/Guangxi/55726/2016 24 November 2016
A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/2017 25 December 2017
Viruses marked with an asterisk (*) were obtained and sequenced within the surveillance activities described in this manuscript.
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all scripts is available in a github repository (https://github.com/
delfinut/phylogenetic-incongruence).
2.4 Analysis of the H5 and N6 genes
For the H5 analysis, 1,251 HA sequences of strains isolated be-
tween January 2016 and March 2018 were downloaded from
GISAID (Supplementary Table S1). For the N6 tree, NA gene
sequences of 1,680 strains of LPAI HxN6 viruses from Genbank,
isolated between January 2007 and January 2018, were used.
The Basic Local Alignment Search Tool (BLAST) was used to find
the closest-related sequences to the HA and NA sequences from
the SOI in the entire influenza virus resource database in FluDB
(www.fludb.org). GISAID has the most up-to-date HPAI sequen-
ces—hence this database was used to acquire HPAI H5 HA
sequences; Genbank has a better representation of HPAI and
LPAI strains taken together, which is why this database was
used for N6 NA sequences which may or may not be associated
with HPAI HAs.
The individual H5 and N6 datasets described above were first
subjected to a quality control step where all duplicate sequen-
ces and sequences bearing duplicate IDs were removed. These
datasets were first analyzed with the SOI and HUM strains.
Sequences were aligned using MAFFT v7.305b (Katoh and
Standley 2013), and used in the FastTree program (Price, Dehal,
and Arkin 2009, 2010) to generate an initial tree. Since both HA
and NA of SOI viruses formed two monophyletic clades each
(excluding all other strains), with robust support (>0.80), the
downloaded sequences were then subjected to down sampling
to a cut-off of 99.5 per cent identity before further analysis. SOI
HA and NA sequences were also down-sampled to 99.9 per cent
identity, respectively. All sequences from taxa which were
found outside of the fully supported (100%) cluster with SOI
were discarded. Ten further sequences were discarded after
analysis of the H5 HA ML tree with tempest v1.5, which identi-
fied them as outliers and did not conform to clock-likeness as
suggested by the authors in Rambaut et al. (2016). Similarly,
nine further sequences were removed as outliers after analysis
of the N6 NA ML tree with tempest v1.5. The H5 HA dataset in-
cluded representatives from the HPAI clade 2.3.4.4 Group B
(H5N8) 2016–17 clade, European and Asian HPAI clade 2.3.4.4
Groups B–D H5N6 viruses, other HPAI H5Nx viruses, as well as
the separate lineage of the Groups C and D Chinese H5N6
strains, to form a new dataset of 153 sequences from which a fi-
nal H5 ML tree was inferred using IQ-TREE. The N6 NA dataset
included a total of 183 sequences from the H5N6 SOI as well as
the most closely related sequences that were from LPAI viruses,
primarily from wild birds. The final N6 ML tree was inferred
from this dataset using IQ-TREE.
Bayesian phylogenetic trees were inferred using BEAST
v1.10.1 (Suchard et al. 2018) to determine the time of emergence
of SOI and the viruses they likely arose from. Path sampling/
stepping stone sampling (Baele et al. 2012) was used to select
the appropriate site substitution and clock models. BEAST cal-
culates log marginal likelihood estimates (MLE) for each run
from which log Bayes factors (BF) (which indicate support for
one model over another) were calculated as the difference be-
tween the log MLEs. SRD06, i.e., the standard HKY site model
with estimated base frequencies and gamma site heterogeneity
with four gamma categories and two codon partitions (1 þ 2, 3)
was chosen over GTR with the empirical base frequencies and
gamma categories with no codon partition (>180 log BF)
(Shapiro, Rambaut, and Drummond 2006). An uncorrelated re-
laxed lognormal clock was used to allow for rate variation along
different branches with Gaussian Markov random field (GMRF)
Bayesian Skyride population prior (chosen over constant prior
with >20 log BF) and random starting tree. All other priors were
set to default. The Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) was set to
70,000,000 generations. Two separate runs were performed to
ensure convergence between runs. Log files were analyzed in
Tracer v1.7.1 to determine convergence, and to check that ESS
values were beyond threshold (>200). Log and trees files from
both runs were combined using Log Combiner v 1.10.1. Tree an-
notator v1.10.1 was used to generate a maximum credibility tree
(MCC) using 10 per cent burn in and median node heights. The
MCC tree was then annotated to include posterior probability
values and time scales and plotted in R v 3.5 using the ggtree
package (Yu 2017).
3. Results
3.1 Wild bird surveillance and sequencing
Continuous active surveillance activities resulted in the screen-
ing of 2,769 wild birds in the Netherlands and 2,190 in the
Republic of Georgia between 9 December 2017 and 30 June 2018.
HPAI H5 viruses were detected in ten Eurasian Wigeons (Anas
penelope, February 2018) in the Netherlands, and in a Mallard
(Anas platyrhynchos, 28 January 2018), and an Armenian Gull
(Larus armenicus, 27 December 2017) in the Republic of Georgia.
In addition, during opportunistic sampling of a small number of
dead birds (passive surveillance) the virus was detected in two
Great Black-backed Gulls (Larus marinus, 18 December 2018 and
23 January 2018) and a Black-headed Gull (Chroicocephalus ridi-
bundus, 18 December 2017) that were found dead in the
Netherlands (Table 2). Full genome sequences were obtained
from one of the HPAI H5N6 infected Dutch Eurasian Wigeons
and the three dead gulls, and from both Georgian birds. All
obtained sequences have been uploaded to GISAID with acces-
sion numbers EPI_ISL_289713, EPI_ISL_289714, EPI_ISL_302823,
EPI_ISL_302824, EPI_ISL_303520, EPI_ISL_312376. During the
mentioned surveillance period no additional LPAI HxN6 viruses
were detected.
3.2 Phylogenetic analyses of the HA segment
Previously, H5 clades have been somewhat geographically re-
stricted with only intermittent incursion of Asian lineage vi-
ruses into Europe. However, here phylogenetic clustering of the
Europe-derived H5N6 SOI was observed with H5N6 strains de-
rived from Asia, such as those isolated from ducks in South
Korea, a Black-faced Spoonbill (Platalea minor) in Taiwan, and a
Mute Swan (Cygnus olor) in Japan in November/December 2017
(Asia-SOI). These latest H5N6 strains were also phylogenetically
similar to recent European/Russian HPAI H5N8 viruses rather
than Asian-derived H5N6 viruses such as the Chinese H5N6s
that have been associated with zoonotic infections
(Supplementary Fig. S1A). The recent, and to date, only, human
H5N6 Group B strain (WHO 2018) (A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/
2017(H5N6)) clustered closer to, but was still distinct from the
recent European H5N6 strains (Fig. 2, Supplementary Fig. S1A).
With the exception of two Vietnamese viruses (A/duck/
Vietnam/QuangBinh/QN530206/2018 and A/chicken/Vietnam/
QuangBinh/BoTrach1113/2017, Fig. 2 marked with §) that clustered
together with the Chinese HPAI H5N6 viruses, both the European-
SOI and Asian-SOI sets of H5N6 viruses had an estimated com-
mon ancestor that circulated in early July 2016 (95% confidence in-
terval April–September 2016). The H5N6 virus isolated from a
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single poultry outbreak in Greece during the 2016–17 HPAI H5N8
epizootic (A/chicken/Greece/39_2017a/2017) clustered with other
2016–17 European H5N8 viruses, suggesting this strain was not an-
cestral to the SOI (Fig. 2, Supplementary Fig. S1A).
However, additional heterogeneity was observed within the
SOI. Phylogenetically clustering within the Europe-SOI were two
Asia-SOI strains; these two Asia-SOI strains were isolated in the
Republic of Georgia. The Republic of Georgia is located in western
Central Asia, on the eastern side of the Black Sea, and here, these
viruses showed a closer phylogenetic relationship with European
strains than with Asian strains. The Europe-SOI and the Georgian
strains had a common ancestor that circulated in early
September 2017 (95% confidence interval July–October 2017), sug-
gesting that there were likely multiple genetically distinct H5 seg-
ments, whose subsequent diffusion within the wild bird
population was not uniform across Eurasia. Similar finer grain
heterogeneity was observed with the four recent Asian strains,
isolated from South Korea in late 2017 and early 2018. These four
South Korean strains were phylogenetically closer to the
European-SOI but distinct from other recent Asian H5N6 2.3.4.4
Group B viruses, isolated from birds in Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan in late 2017/early 2018. The Korean and European viruses
shared a common ancestor that circulated in July 2017 (95% con-
fidence interval May–September 2017). This suggests that poten-
tially two separate HA reassortment events led to heterogenous
H5N6 viruses circulating within Eurasia from July 2016 and co-
circulating in South Korea in late 2017 (Fig. 2).
3.3 Phylogenetic analyses of the NA segment
Since the H5N6 HA arose from the recent H5N8 strains,
attempts were made to trace the reassortment event or events
Figure 2. BEAST trees from viral sequences of HA (H5) gene sequences isolated from avian hosts between January 2016 and April 2018 with the addition of four H5N6
HA genes isolated from humans and seven co-circulating HPAI H5N2/H5N8 viruses (purple). Tip symbols are coloured according to the HA origin displaying our
European-SOI (blue), Asian-SOI (red), the Chinese HPAI H5N6 viruses (orange) with the Chinese human-derived viruses (black), the 2016–17 HPAI H5N8 viruses (green),
and other HPAI H5Nx viruses (purple). Tip symbols depict the location: Central Asia/Russia (), Eastern/Southern Asia (), Europe (), and other (þ). Presence of node
symbol () indicates posterior P > 0.85. The numbers above the nodes represent TMRCA, the grey bars display the accompanying 95 per cent confidence interval.
Viruses marked with an asterisk (*) were obtained and sequenced within the surveillance activities described in this manuscript.
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that potentially led to the emergence of these H5N6 viruses. All
N6 NA segments derived from LPAI and HPAI viruses from 2007
to January 2018 were collected and combined with the SOI to
trace the origin of N6. The closest genetically related N6 to all
HPAI H5N6 strains appeared to be LPAI H4N6 strains from the
Republic of Georgia in 2016 (Fig. 3, Supplementary Fig. S1B).
BEAST analysis estimated that a common ancestor for all N6
genes related to HPAI H5 viruses that circulated in early January
2016 (albeit with a large 95% confidence interval between April
2015 and October 2016). The N6 segments of the Korean and
European/Georgian viruses seemed to have diverged right at the
beginning of 2017. The most recent common ancestor for the N6
related to only the European/Georgian HPAI H5N6 viruses that
circulated in April 2017 (95% confidence interval December
2016–August 2017). The N6 from the Greek H5N6 strain from
February 2017 phylogenetically clustered alone and diverged
from its closest relatives, some of the Asia-SOI, in late summer
2016, indicating that this Greek virus was an unrelated reassort-
ment event that did not continue to circulate and was not an-
cestral to the currently circulating N6 genes related to the HPAI
H5 viruses (Fig. 3).
3.4 Full genome phylogeny
BALTIC was used to compare the phylogenetic structure of the
internal genes of the SOI compared to other HPAI H5 and LPAI
viruses. Supplementary Fig. S1A–H shows the ML trees for all
eight gene segments of the SOI together with a down-sampled
set of all avian viruses isolated between 2007 and 2018. To visu-
alize incongruence, the phylogenetic position of each sequence
(coloured according to the origin of its HA) was traced across all
seven trees (Fig. 4). The eighth gene segment, NA, is excluded
Figure 3. BEAST trees from viral sequences of NA (N6) gene sequences isolated from avian hosts between January 2007 and April 2018. Tip symbols are coloured accord-
ing to the HA origin with recent Asian (red) and European (blue) HPAI H5N6 viruses, the early 2017 Greek (GRC) HPAI H5N6 (green), and (non-H5) HxN6 (grey) viruses.
Symbols depict the location: Central Asia/Russia (), Eastern/Southern Asia () and Europe (). Presence of node symbol () indicates posterior P>0.85. The numbers
above the nodes represent TMRCA, the grey bars display the accompanying 95 per cent confidence interval. Viruses marked with an asterisk (*) were obtained and se-
quenced within the surveillance activities described in this manuscript.
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from this because not all viruses were N6 viruses, hence this
tree would rather show the obvious genetic differences between
different NA subtypes, than tracing the N6.
The HA of the recent European/Asian SOI clustered within the
2016/17 HPAI H5N8 cluster, and the NA segments were most
closely related to LPAI N6s, as described above (Figs 2 and 3,
Supplementary Fig. S1A and B). A/Mallard/Republic_of_Georgia/1/
2018 (H5N6) showed a closer relationship to recent European vi-
ruses than to Asian viruses for all eight gene segments (Fig. 4,
Supplementary Fig. S1). The MP, NP, NS, and PB1 segments of re-
cent Asian- and European-SOI were related to respective internal
genes from 2016 to 2017 clade 2.3.4.4 (H5N8) strains
(Supplementary Fig. S1). In contrast, although A/Armenian_Gull/
Republic_of_Georgia/4/2017 (H5N6) was closely related to the
European H5N6 viruses for the HA and NA segments, all of its in-
ternal genes clustered with those of LPAI and other HPAI H5 vi-
ruses, indicating extensive reassortment (Figs 2–4, Supplementary
Fig. S1).
For PA, SOI from Europe and the Republic of Georgia (except
A/Great_Black-backed_Gull/Netherlands/1/2017) phylogeneti-
cally clustered with LPAI H7, H3, and H4 viruses from
Bangladesh, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Georgia from
2014 to 2016. Phylogenetically distinct from this PA group, the
A/Great_Black-backed_Gull/Netherlands/1/2017 and all Asia-SOI
(except the H5N6 virus from the Republic of Georgia) clustered
together with 2016/17 Russian/European HPAI H5N8 viruses.
These different PA clusters likely represent separate reassort-
ment events. (Supplementary Fig. S1F).
Phylogeny based on the PB2 gene resulted in similar cluster-
ing patterns as compared with PA. However, the closest-related
PB2 genes to the Europe-SOI/Republic of Georgia cluster arose
from viruses that circulated in 2014–5 in domestic birds in
Europe. In contrast, PB2 segments of the Asia-SOI and A/
Great_Black-backed_Gull/Netherlands/1/2017 clustered with
PB2 segments from 2016 to 2017 Russian/European H5N8
(Supplementary Fig. S1H). None of the H5N6 SOI gene segments
were associated with respective segments found in or near the
Chinese Groups C and D viruses (Fig. 4). However, the recent
Group B human H5N6 virus (A/Fujian-Sanyuan/21099/
2017(H5N6)) isolated in China in 2017 was more similar to HPAI
H5N8 clade viruses with a PA segment that is closely related to
both HPAI H5N8 clade and HPAI H5N6 European clade viruses.
4. Discussion
New reassortant HPAI clade 2.3.4.4 Group B H5N6 viruses have
been detected in both wild birds and poultry in several
European and Asian countries from December 2017 onwards.
Phylogenetic analyses of these viruses showed that although
they were related to the 2016–17 European HPAI H5N8 viruses,
they were not the result of continued circulation of the single
HPAI clade 2.3.4.4 Group B H5N6 virus that was detected in
Greece in early 2017 during the 2016–17 clade 2.3.4.4 Group B
H5N8 European outbreak. Based on these results, we conclude
that these European and some recent Asian HPAI H5N6 viruses
Figure 4. Phylogenetic incongruence analysis. Maximum likelihood trees for the HA segment and all internal genes MP, NP, NS, PA, PB1, and PB2 from equivalent
strains were connected across the trees. Tips and connecting lines are coloured according to HA clade.
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are new reassortant viruses of HPAI H5 clade 2.3.4.4 Group B vi-
ruses with LPAI virus segments likely derived from wild birds
rather than from LPAI viruses in poultry or from introductions
of the (zoonotic) Asian HPAI H5N6 viruses that have been fre-
quently detected in Southeast Asia since 2014. The common
ancestors of the HA and NA gene segments of the recent
European HPAI H5N6 viruses were estimated to have circulated
in early September 2017 (confidence interval: July–October) and
April 2017 (confidence interval: December 2016–August 2017),
respectively. Previously published time estimates for the most
recent common ancestors for these HPAI H5N6 viruses detected
in the Netherlands (Beerens et al. 2018) and Europe/Korea
(Kwon et al. 2018) were January–September 2016 and January–
October 2016 for HA, and December 2014–July 2016 and
September 2015 (confidence interval: August 2014–August 2016)
for NA, respectively. These estimates are different from these
new estimates and with much broader confidence intervals.
This can be explained by the more extensive dataset in the pre-
sent study, including both a representative set of circulating
HPAI H5 viruses and a large number of LPAI viruses that enabled
us to narrow the time estimates of when reassortment events
with other viruses may have occurred.
Although wild birds are generally not considered as a long-
term maintenance reservoir for HPAI viruses, bird diversity,
density, the aggregation of birds from different geographical
areas, and the high density of immune-naı¨ve birds on breeding
sites can all contribute to both temporary HPAI virus mainte-
nance and to the potential generation of novel reassortants
with LPAI gene segments. Previous phylogenetic studies have
shown that both HPAI clade 2.3.4.4 H5N8 viruses that caused
outbreaks in Europe in 2014–15 and 2016–17 originated in
Southeast Asia and subsequently spread to Europe (Lycett et al.
2016; Pohlmann et al. 2017), with diffusion mediated by wild
birds (Lycett et al. 2016). However, in contrast to previous epi-
zootics where an HPAI H5 progenitor was derived from poultry
and diffused in wild birds, it is more plausible that these recent
H5N6 viruses evolved during 2017 by reassortment of a
European HPAI H5N8 virus and wild host reservoir LPAI viruses,
within the wild bird reservoir itself, given the more restricted
gene pool in poultry. We therefore hypothesize that these reas-
sortment events occurred either during 2017 on the Palaearctic
breeding grounds where birds from Europe and Asia gather
when a large number of hatch-year birds entered the wild bird
population, or just after breeding, when naı¨ve hatch-year birds
and adults dispersed from the breeding grounds to aggregate in
large numbers, particularly to moult (Newton 2011).
Previously, differences in mortality rates were found in HPAI
H5 epizootics mediated by wild birds (Alarcon et al. 2018). Here,
the combination of enzootic presence of LPAI viruses, a large
immunologically heterogenous population, with possible pre-
existing immunity to clade 2.3.4.4 Group B viruses from the
previous HPAI waves, and the start of migration might have en-
abled multiple novel reassortants to emerge and to disperse
both east and west to the wintering grounds, resulting in co-
circulation of reassortants of different genotypes in both Europe
and East Asia. The timing of the first detection of the new H5N6
viruses was later (mid-December) (Beerens et al. 2018) compared
with both H5N8 outbreaks (early November (Harder et al. 2015)
and late October (OIE 2016), respectively) but the variation in de-
tection was likely within normal ecological variation of wild
bird movements and population dynamics. Possible ecological
and population-based explanations for such outbreak timing
variation include the presence of pre-existing immunity to
clade 2.3.4.4 Group B viruses possibly leading to less severe
infections, the potential for partial immunity to facilitate co-
infection and recovery rather than mortality, with reassortment
and onwards transmission resulting from these altered popula-
tion factors. Additionally partial or pre-existing immunity might
lead to a relative reduction in disease burden and the number of
infected birds, fewer infected wild birds without obvious in-
creased mortality, differences in climatic factors between years
that influenced the dispersal of wild birds (Vandegrift et al.
2010) and thus relative prevalence, or the alteration of the struc-
ture and size of the wild bird population by the previous incur-
sion (Kleyheeg et al. 2017) and the relative proportion of
susceptible birds in the population differed across years.
Although some HPAI H5 viruses were associated with mor-
tality in wild birds (Chen et al. 2005; Keawcharoen et al. 2008;
Kleyheeg et al. 2017; Pohlmann et al. 2017), serological evidence
and the detections of HPAI H5 viruses in clinically healthy birds
(Verhagen et al. 2015; Poen et al. 2016, 2018) indicate that infec-
tions can be non-lethal, enabling the spread of these viruses
over longer distances with flight. To the authors’ knowledge all
previous reports on HPAI H5N6 detections in Europe have been
from either diseased or dead birds. Here, the detection of HPAI
H5N6 virus from a clinically healthy Armenian Gull (December
2017) and a Mallard (January 2018) in the Republic of Georgia,
and in clinically healthy Eurasian Wigeons in February 2017 in
the Netherlands are reported. Wild birds are considered to be a
temporary spill-over host for HPAI viruses that originate from
poultry, and HPAI viruses are generally considered to be unable
to become endemic in the wild bird population. The present
results and those previously published (Beerens et al. 2018;
Kwon et al. 2018) indicate that the recent HPAI clade 2.3.4.4
Group B H5N6 viruses were reassortants from several wild bird
viruses, and time estimates for these reassortment events sug-
gested that reassortment happened in wild birds without the in-
volvement of poultry. In addition, HPAI H5N6 viruses have been
detected in wild birds in Europe over the course of 2018, al-
though there were no detections in commercial poultry after
March 2018, nor in backyard poultry between March and
September 2018 (OIE 2018). These viruses may indeed have
adapted to wild birds by causing non-lethal infections, and
thereby enabled themselves to be maintained in the wild bird
population. To date the precise wild bird species involved in the
long-distance dispersal of these viruses are still unknown, but
with expanding genetic heterogeneity in both wild birds and
poultry the risk of diffusion of HPAI variants among geographic
areas is an ever-present threat.
Clade 2.3.4.4 Groups A and B H5N8 viruses have not been as-
sociated with human infections, and pathogenesis and trans-
mission studies in ferrets showed that these viruses are not of
current concern for human health (Richard et al. 2015; Grund
et al. 2018; Lee et al. 2018b). In contrast, clade 2.3.4.4 Groups B–D
H5N6 viruses have been reported to cause human infections in
China (Aveyard et al. 2016; Pan et al. 2016), and show a high ge-
netic variability. Based on the present phylogenetic results, all
eight gene segments of the currently circulating European and
most Asian H5N6 viruses, with the exception of some Chinese
and Vietnamese viruses, clustered with either HPAI H5N8 or
LPAI viruses, and showed a clear separation from the human
clade 2.3.4.4 Groups C and D viruses. Recently the WHO reported
a human infection with a clade 2.3.4.4 Group B virus (A/Fujian-
Sanyuan/21099/2017(H5N6)) (WHO 2018a) though this is to date,
a single isolation. However, the evolutionary dynamics charac-
terized in this study highlight the potential for rapid virus evo-
lution, alterations in host susceptibility even within an H5
subclade and demonstrate the necessity to continually assess
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the risk of emerging variants to both animal and human health.
It is also important to understand the underlying principles and
drivers that enable global HPAI virus migration through both ac-
tive and passive, ecologically-targeted and longitudinal surveil-
lance in wild birds and poultry.
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